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The mediterranean region and NATO'S 
southern flank 
This is the first in a series of 
three articles that will examine the 
mediterranean region in terms of 
western strategic interests. 
This article specifically analyzes 
the southern flank of the North 
American Treaty Alliance (NATO) 
within the mediterranean geopoli- 
tical contex. After defining the two 
elements that determine the cohe- 
sion of the region (the ocean and 
the presence of the two super-po- 
wers in the zone) the author goes 
on to discus the flank itself. 
This definition allows us to un- 
derstand the geographical charac- 
teristics of the region (the largest 
and most disperse of all the NATO 
zones) which directly affect the al- 
liance's defensive organization. The 
importance of the region stems 
from the direct control it main- 
tains over all mediterranean traffic 
from a military point of view as 
well as from a commercial pers- 
pective (petroleum-maritime corre- 
dor). 
The southern flank finds itself 
threatened by the fragmentation 
resulting from interna1 conflicts as 
well as by the nererous and dever- 
se defensive fronts. One of these, 
the eastern-turkish front, has been 
reappraised in the light of the uns- 
table interna1 situation of recent 
years. 
Alongside this lack of interna1 co- 
hesion there exists a situation of 
subordination within the alliance. 
Given the policies developed by 
NATO based on the notion of a 
central european front, the sout- 
hern region has traditionally been 
considered a peripheral zone. As 
viewed by the U.S. the southern 
flank is simply encompassed in the 
global mediterranean strategy. This 
position treats this passageway as 
merely one more element in a 
grand strategy of a global nature 
in which the ocean plays the role 
of ccmiddle po in t~  between the at- 
lantic and the Middle eastern zone 
of ccvital interests. 
The day after ... deploy ment 
This article examines some of 
the deployment of the euromissi- 
les. Two questions are posed in or- 
der to establish a framework for 
discussion: first, does the deploy- 
ment of the euromissiles streng- 
then the security of western euro- 
pe? and second, how does the de- 
ployment of these missiles influen- 
ce the risk of nuclear war? 
The answer to the first question 
is <<no)). Deployment doesn't streng- 
then the region's disuasive capabi- 
lity; and yet it adds to the risks fa- 
ced by Europe if such disuasion is 
unsuccessful. 
The second question draws our 
attention to what is known as the 
theory of ((nuclear blackmail), 
which it clearly reinforces; and 
this merely encourages the tenden- 
cy towards c~proliferation~). But in 
addition to this, the euromissiles 
mark the introduction of a new ge- 
neration of nuclear weapons and 
systems. The characteristics of this 
new generation of weapons will on- 
ly create conditions of strategic ins- 
tability which in turn will only in- 
crease the risk of nuclear war. 
It would certainly be preferable 
to avoid viewing these conditions 
in terms of traditional bi-polar po- 
litics, although one obviously can- 
not prevent his from occurring. 
The reader is free to do so, if he or 
she chooses; but the author wishes 
to emphasize that the arguments 
presented in this paper don't single 
out a ((good guyn a ~(bad g u y ~ ;  nor 
is there an <(aggressor)) oral ((de- 
fenders. Everything follows from 
whit is the logic of ((nuclear disua- 
siona, as well as from the technical 
characteristics of the devices them- 
selves. 
Perhaps the greatest paradox of 
our times is that the disuasive de- 
posits increase the risk of war mo- 
re than they guarantee the security 
of western europe. In fact, in try- 
ing to avoid premeditated nuclear 
wars which are currently unfeasi- 
ble, undesired nuclear wars might 
become feasible (although no less 
deadly). 
December, 1983:- Epicenter of the crisis 
In  the first part of this article 
the author analyzes the crisis in re- 
lations between the two blocks. 
Particular attention is paid to the 
most acute manifestation of this 
crisis when in 1983 discussions bet- 
ween the U.S.A. and the USSR we- 
re completely broken off. The suc- 
cessive negotiations in progress at 
the time vere  qlso discontinued; 
and, above all, the installation of 
the Pershing I1 and cruise missiles 
began in West Germany, Great Bri- 
tain and Italy. 
Nevertheless, the author believes 
that January 1984 marks the begin- 
ning of a period of de-escalation. 
There are various indicators to this 
effect, such as Reagan's re-election 
campaign - .  this year; the ambiguity 
- .  
of the soviet position owing to the 
absence of ~ n d r o ~ o v ;  the opening 
of the conference on disarmament 
in Europe (CDE); and the inter- 
view scheduled to take place bet- 
ween Gromvko and Schultz. 
The article goes on to analyze the 
cronology and consequences of the 
failure of the INF negotiations, em- 
phasizing the importance of the 
northamerican attitude in the evo- 
lution of events. 
The author notes that efforts to 
establish a stable balance of forces 
are relative. This is evident in the 
diversity of explanations as to why 
this project has been stalled, as 
well as the distinct factors or va- 
riables that must be taken into ac- 
count when comparing the arsenals 
of both bands. The underlying 
question in negotiating isn't the 
technical~ pursuit of parity (which 
in fact exists but cansot be achie- 
ved absolutely) but the attitude 
and political disposition of the two 
super-powers. 
~emocrat ic ' recover~ and relations with 
Latin America 
In the conference given by Luis 
Yañez at CIDOB two main points 
were discussed: the appearance 
and recuperation of democracy in 
Latin America; and relations bet- 
ween Spain and Latin America. 
The world economic crisis has af- 
fected Latin America in an special 
way. All the effects, however, have 
not been negative. In the political 
sphere there is intense popular 
pressure to achieve democracy and 
new modes of participation: Latin 
America enters the 1980s under the 
sign of pluralistic democracy. No- 
wadays this concept is not asso- 
ciated with communism by the 
bourgeoise, nor is it equated with 
cccontinuismon or ccintegrismo), by 
the left. The example of Spain's 
transition to democracy has played 
an important role in the rebirth of 
democratic ideas in Latin America. 
Yañez undertakes a historical re- 
view of iberamerican -spanish re- 
lations since the colonial period 
anc! including: the process of in- 
dependence, the Franco period in- 
Spain (represented by theories of 
hispanic identity), etc; but in addi- 
tion to these historical characteris- 
tics, there remains a cultural-lin- 
guistic heritage which includes 
idiosyncracies, a sense of solidarity 
and mutual closeness. as well as 
those factors contributing to socio- 
economic dependence and under- 
development. These conditions to- 
gether with the shift to democracy 
have paved the way towards new 
perspectives in spanish-latinameri- 
can relations since 1977. 
The author maintains the need 
to advance toward the conceDt of 
regional integration in the form of 
an iberamerican community of na- 
tions (not in the way outlined by 
the EEC in the treaty of Rome 
but with long term, concrete po- 
licies). In fact, there already 
exist a number of elements that 
define the framework for such po- 
licies: the spanish constitutional 
m~narchy; our ties to regional ibe- 
ramerican organizations such as 
the OAS, CEPAL, SELA, ALADI, the 
Grupo Andino.. .; the principal of 
cooperation; and above all contri- 
butions in the cultural, technologi- 
cal, scientific, educational and com- 
municative realms. In the authors 
opinion none of the above repre- 
sent new forms of dependence or 
neocolonialism. 
Yañez notes, however, that Spain 
has limited experience in this area. 
None of the initiatives taken were 
the product of any pre-existing po- 
licies. As a result there has been 
confusion and duplication in role 
assigned. Neither the legislative ini- 
atives, administrative structures 
nor the budget commitments suffi- 
ciently respond to the needed COO- 
peration for development in Latin 
America. Parodoxically, Spain is 
the most country for the underta- 
king of such cooperation plans in 
Latin America. 
In the author's word, ccThe stra- 
tegic objective is the construction 
of an Latin American community 
of nations based on the principal 
of integration with cooperation be- 
ing the most valuable to01 with 
which to facilitate development,,. 
The democratic state and the judicial 
questión: the case of Argentina 
This article attempts to explain 
the traditional mode in which the 
administration of justice has func- 
tioned in the argentinean republic. 
This mode of functioning is found 
to be bound to a conception of ju- 
risprudence described as legalistic 
positivism expressed in the form 
of cryptic justice, removed from 
the social reality it has duty to 
comprehend. 
In an effort expound on some 
alternative conception, reference is 
made to other contemporary pers- 
pectives which based on principal 
of law and jurisprudence, have 
emerged from diverse cultural ex- 
periences. These views question the 
belief in the judicial function as a 
power independent of the argenti- 
nean state in accordance with the 
classic tripartitc concept. From 
this analysis a serious criticism, 
supported by abundant evidence, 
emerges of the highly regarded ju- 
dicial ccindependence,,. A close look 
at said ccindependence), highlights 
the need to re-evaluate the concept 
with special emphasis on the ser- 
vice tradition the argentian judges 
-as a body- have shown towards 
certain social interests. 
The search for new channels un- 
dertaken in other cultural realms 
allows the author to suggest the 
possibility of finding ways to ga. 
rantee the necessary independence 
of judges. This garantee would 
seem to be that of self or co-go- 
vernment of the judicial system, 
which in other countrys has achie- 
ved a somewhat different expres- 
sion and application as well as dif- 
ferent results, as one would logi- 
cally expect. 
This system of autor co-judicial 
government sliould be accompa- 
nied by a re-evaluation of the prin- 
cipal of association among argen- 
tinian judges which has always 
been clearly understood to be the a skeletal program emerges with 
simple corporate expression adep- which to advance a profund de- 
tly disguised behind a mask of fal- mocratic reform of the argentinian 
se apoliticism. justice system which will undoub- 
From the analysis of the various ted have to confront deeply en- 
experiences in other cultural areas trenched problems. 
The foreign policy of the Rumanian 
Communist Party 
National interests are the focal 
point around which revolve foreign 
as well as national policies. Accord- 
ing to the author this national in- 
terest has two significant compo- 
nents: economic development and 
national unity. Both are an integral 
part of the much broader concept 
of national sovereignty, avidly def- 
ended by the Rumanians. 
The rumanian communist party 
boasts of having a central role in 
national and foreign decision ma- 
king, although in reality it exercises 
its authority in interna1 policy mat- 
ters in accordance with standards 
provided by the soviet model. In 
questions of foreign policy, howe- 
ver, Rumania diverges from the po- 
litical line defined by the USSR 
whenever this line interfers with 
the nationalistic content of oblecti- 
ves pursued within the country. 
This interpretation of the coun- 
try's ideology is refiected in the 
concept rumanian leaders have of 
the norms that should govern re- 
lation with other countries. None- 
theless it should not be forgotten 
that Rumania is an integral part of 
the community of socialist coun- 
tries and a member of the Varso- 
via Pact which imposes certain li- 
mits on the country's foreign poli- 
cy conduct. All in all, Rumania is 
quite autonomous in this respect, 
although its inicial positions have 
changed owing to the evolution of 
international polictical realities as 
well as changes in the country's 
economic necessities. 1 
Since 1965 two stages can be dis- 
tinguished in the evolution of polic- 
tical events within the country: in 
the first, the national and foreign 
policies put forward by the com- 
munist party complemented each 
other. The process of national awa- 
reness was fostered by the presen- 
ce of a more open cultural climate; 
internationaly this awareness fo- 
und its expression in the defense of 
the country's territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty. The de- 
velopment of the rumanian econo- 
my together with climate of déten- 
te at that time resulted in the for- 
ging of diplomatic relations with 
western countries. This in turn ope- 
ned the door to important interna- 
tional commercial markets. This 
divergent posture, however, didn't 
provoke a direct response from the 
USSR, in that the constant streng- 
thening of the role of party leaders 
nationally served as adequate com- 
pensation. 
Nonetheless the rigidity o£ party 
structures, together with the im- 
pact of the international economic 
crisis on the rumanian economy 
-given its foreign dependence- 
has modified the conduct of the 
country's politicians since 1974 
(although this wasn't evident intil 
1979). In this second stage, then, 
economic problems, as well as the 
elevated foreign debt have brought 
the country closer to the Soviet 
Union. Currently, although Ceases- 
cu keeps alive the traditional policy 
of maintaining ties with all coun- 
tries, while at the same time conti- 
nuing to advocate disarmament 
and the development of a new in- 
ternational order, one can no lon- 
ger talk of the union between natio- 
nal and foreign policy. The situa- 
tion is quite the opposite: in the 
international sphere Rumania is 
trying to do what it can no loriger 
achieve in the national arena. 
Soviet international policy: 
mythes and reality 
The history of soviet internatio- 
nal policy is to a certain extent the 
history of how an atypical revolu- 
tion (from the point of view of 
world-revolution theoreticians) gi- 
ves rise to a normative model of 
world influence; at the same time 
it is the history of how the politi- 
cal, social and economic characte- 
ristics and dictates of a given his- 
torical moment in a given country 
become institutionalized in the 
laws and universal norms of so- 
cial transformation. 
From Stalin to Brezhnev all so. 
viet foreign policy has evolved wi- 
thin the framework of fixed politi- 
cal and. theoretical points of refe- 
rence; and it has been guided by 
one immutable objective; the exter- 
nal consolidation of soviet state po- 
wer, in its diverse forms, as func- 
tion of the successive course of in- 
ternal priorities as welll as the cor- 
relation of forces in the internatio- 
nal arena. Along side this exists 
the unvarying perspectiva of world 
hegemony that avoids direct con- 
frontation. c(Socia1ism is just one 
country~, ~peaceful co-existence)), 
c~detente),, are different names for 
the same dynamic as understood 
by the soviet leaders who -ever 
since 1917- have stated their lo- 
yalty to a coherent political line 
(although not for the reasons they 
cite). The study of this coherence, 
of how it has continued adapting 
itself to international develop- 
ments, as well as the impact it has 
had on the latter, is the basis sine 
qua non for an understanding of 
soviet foreign policy. 
